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INTRODUCTION
In Milkovich v. LorainJournal Co.,' the Supreme Court of the
United States mapped a new course for "opinions" as free
speech when it held a sports writer liable for implying a ver-
ifiably false statement in a sports column.2 Prior to Milkovich,
courts continually struggled to distinguish fact from opinion
before extending first amendment protection. 3 Although a
statement may have been defamatory, courts frequently carved
out a first amendment exception for an utterance classified as
an opinion.4 Contrary to previous judicial decisions, the
Supreme Court in Milkovich refused to grant absolute first
amendment protection to statements classified as opinion.
The Court pointed out a "mistaken reliance on... Gertz,"' and
held that existing constitutional doctrines provide adequate
safeguards for first amendment protection.6 However, the
Supreme Court ruling does not completely bar opinion as a
defense. The Court in Milkovich attempted to set forth a stan-
dard that distinguishes protected statements from false factual
assertions masquerading as opinions.7
The law of defamation strives to balance protection of an
individual's reputation with the guaranteed right of free ex-
1. 110 S. Ct. 2695 (1990).
2. Id. at 2707.
3. See infra notes 33-63 and accompanying text (discussing the "fact-opinion"
dichotomy).
4. See infra notes 23-32 and accompanying text (discussing the "fair comment"
exception).
5. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2706. The Court in Milkovich held that Gertz v. Rob-
ert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), was not "intended to create a wholesale defa-
mation exemption for anything that might be labeled 'opinion.'" Milkovich, 110 S.
Ct. at 2705.
6. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2706 ("[W]e think the 'breathing space' which 'free-
doms of expression require in order to survive' is adequately secured by existing
constitutional doctrine without the creation of an artificial dichotomy between 'opin-
ion' and fact." (citations omitted)).
7. Id. at 2707.
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pression.' Finding a balance is important because both reputa-
tion and free speech play important roles in society. The
balance between reputation and free expression becomes par-
ticularly difficult when an individual expresses an opinion that
purports to convey a defamatory fact. While free speech is an
essential element underlying the democratic process of our
country,9 public discourse on matters of imperative concern
can potentially injure an individual's reputation. Although the
first amendment is vehemently protected, courts also recog-
nize that reputation "reflects ... our basic concept of the es-
sential dignity and worth of every human being-a concept at
the root of any decent system of ordered liberty."'° Recogniz-
ing that the two competing interests must coexist, the Milkovich
Court attempted to reconcile free expression and reputation
within a world comprised of opinions.
This Comment focuses on the impact Milkovich may have on
future defamation cases within the Eighth Circuit. Part I traces
the development of the fact-opinion distinction and the vari-
ous tests used by the Eighth Circuit to distinguish fact from
opinion." Part II discusses the Supreme Court's decision in
Milkovich, analyzing the majority opinion as well as Justice
Brennan's dissent, in which Justice Marshall joined. Part III
discusses how the Milkovich standard may affect the Eighth Cir-
cuit.' 2 The Supreme Court's decision narrows the scope of
8. "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
9. For a discussion of the importance of free speech in a democratic society, see
Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SuP. CT. REV. 245. Meiklejohn,
considered an authority on the political theory of free speech, argued that the first
amendment is an absolute, particularly in the arena of political debate. He stated
that the government belongs to the people of the United States. To effectively carry
out the role of self-government, citizens must seize the opportunity for unqualified,
nonrestricted debate. Only then can the voters possess all the necessary information
to judge issues of public concern. Id. at 253-57; see also Schauer, The Role of the People
in First Amendment Theory, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 761, 772 (1986) (discussing various theo-
ries of free speech based on "deontological perspectives "-the idea that "speaking is
part of what it is to be a person, and restrictions on that expression of personhood by
the state are simply wrong, even if the public interest would be served by those
restrictions").
10. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring).
11. The Eighth Circuit currently uses the "totality of the circumstances" test, a
product of Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 979 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc), cert. denied,
471 U.S. 1127 (1985), adopted by the Eighth Circuit in Janklow v. Newsweek, Inc.,
788 F.2d 1300 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 883 (1986). See infra notes
53-67 (describing the "totality of the circumstances" test).
12. The changes promulgated in defamation law as a result of Milkovich and set
1991]
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protected opinion and extends the substantive reach of defa-
forth in this Comment are not limited to the Eighth Circuit. The analysis and discus-
sion in this Comment will, however, be limited to Eighth Circuit cases and standards.
As of March 1991, the Eighth Circuit was one of seven circuits that had not applied
the Milkovich decision. The federal courts that have applied Milkovich illustrate the
changes the United States Supreme Court mandated in the law of defamation. See,
e.g., Unelko Corp. v. Rooney, 912 F.2d 1049 (9th Cir. 1990); Scott v. Flowers, 910
F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1990); White v. Fraternal Order of Police, 909 F.2d 512 (D.C. Cir.
1990); Don King Prods., Inc. v. Douglas, 742 F. Supp. 778 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); United
States Medical Corp. v. M.D. Buyline, Inc., 753 F. Supp. 676 (S.D. Ohio 1990);
Scheetz v. Morning Call, Inc., 747 F. Supp. 1515 (E.D. Pa. 1990); Scheidler v. Na-
tional Org. for Women, Inc., 751 F. Supp. 743 (N.D. I1. 1990).
In Unelko, the Ninth Circuit found the allegedly defamatory statement to be an
objectively verifiable event, but affirmed summary judgment for the defendant on the
ground that the plaintiff failed to show falsity. The court adopted Milkovich and ana-
lyzed the challenged statement in light of (1) rhetorical hyperbole; (2) general
tenor; and (3) whether the statement was capable of being proved true or false.
Unelko Corp. 912 F.2d at 1053. In Scott, the court held that provably false factual
connotations are protected along with statements that cannot be interpreted as stat-
ing or implying defamatory facts. Scott, 910 F.2d at 215 n.31 (Garwood, J., dissent-
ing). In White, the court cited Milkovich as authority to give great weight to
defamation by implication. White, 909 F.2d at 522-23. In Douglas, the court held that
statements made by promoter Don King during a Mike Tyson-James Buster Doug-
las boxing match regarding an "injustice here if the decision holds that Mike Tyson is
knocked out" could not reasonably be interpreted as conveying actual facts. Douglas,
742 F. Supp. at 783. In M.D. Buyline, the court held that, based on Milkovich, the
alleged defamatory statement may reasonably be interpreted as stating actual facts.
M.D. Buyline, 753 F. Supp. at 679. In Scheetz, the court suggested that the Milkovich
decision restricts the first amendment. Scheetz, 747 F. Supp. at 1524 n. 13. Finally, in
Scheidler, the court reversed an earlier decision in light of Milkovich and held that the
statements at issue were " 'sufficiently factual to be susceptible of being proved true
or false' " and were thus actionable. Scheidler, 751 F. Supp. at 745 (quoting Milkovich,
110 S. Ct. at 2707).
A state may choose to employ more restrictive standards than the ones set forth
in Milkovich. For example, in Immuno AG. v. Moor-Jankowski, 74 N.Y.2d 548, 549
N.E.2d 129, 549 N.Y.S.2d 938 (1989), the New York Court of Appeals affirmed the
dismissal of a libel action against the editor of a scientific journal after the editor
published a "letter to the editor" that allegedly defamed the plaintiff. The United
States Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case "for further con-
sideration in light of Milkovich." Immuno AG. v. Moor-Jankowski, 110 S. Ct. 3266
(1990). On remand, the New York high court adhered to its earlier decision, premis-
ing its opinion "on independent state constitutional grounds as well as the federal
review directed by the Supreme Court." Immuno AG. v. Moor-Jankowski, 77 N.Y.2d
235, 240, 567 N.E.2d 1270, 1272, 566 N.Y.S.2d 906, 908 (1991).
A state court may also insulate itself from federal review if the state court bases
its decision strictly on the state's constitution. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032,
1037-44 (1983); see also Janklow v. Viking Press, 459 N.W.2d 415, 429 (S.D. 1990)
(Henderson, J., dissenting). "We do not need the United States Supreme Court to
interpret our own state constitution. That is within our province. We have the right
to grant greater rights [than] the Federal Constitution." id
Nevertheless, distinguishing protected opinion from actionable fact is a matter
of federal constitutional law. Olman, 750 F.2d at 975 n.8. Consequently, if the state
court's decision is "interwoven with the federal law" and is not clear on its face as to
[Vol. 17
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mation claims. Procedurally, Milkovich may also impact the
pretrial posture of defamation suits in the Eighth Circuit as
well as the involvement of the jury. The conclusion presents
several policy questions Eighth Circuit courts must now face in
light of Milkovich.
I. THE CREATION OF THE OPINION PRIVILEGE
Throughout history, genuinely communicated opinions and
matters of legitimate public interest have been afforded limited
immunity under the common law.' 3 The common law changed
significantly in 1974 when judicial interpretation completely al-
tered the face and scope of the opinion privilege.' 4 Opinions
were held to have complete, unqualified protection under the
first amendment.' 5 Courts and commentators subsequently
argued that existing Supreme Court doctrines lacked any co-
herent guidance as to what was actionable fact and what was
protected expression of opinion. As a result, courts have
struggled to formulate various tests to guide the fact-opinion
analysis. '
6
A. The Common Law
Common law defamation employed a strict liability standard,
primarily to redress attacks upon reputation and punish false
the court's intent, then federal review is not barred. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2701 n.5
(quoting Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. at 1040).
State court interpretations of Milkovich seem to reconcile Milkovich and the
Oilman "totality of the circumstances" test. See, e.g., Moyer v. Amador Valley Joint
Union High School Dist., 225 Cal. App. 3d 720, 724, 275 Cal. Rptr. 494, 497 (1990)
(finding that "Milkovich did not substantially change the[ ] principles" developed
under Gertz); Florida Medical Center, Inc. v. New York Post Co., 568 So. 2d 454, 456-
57, 459 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that, based on Milkovich, protected state-
ments must be capable of being proved true or false; considering the context of de-
fendant's newspaper and the fact that the statement appeared in a business column, it
is "more likely to be taken as fact"); Hunt v. University of Minnesota, 465 N.W.2d 88,
93-94 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (acknowledging that Milkovich narrows the scope of
opinion but applying the "totality of the circumstances" test).
13. Note, The Fact-Opinion Determination in Defamation, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 810
(1988).
14. After Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), courts held state-
ments classified as opinion to be absolutely protected under the first amendment.
See, e.g., Janklow v. Newsweek, Inc., 788 F.2d 1300 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 883 (1986).
15. For courts that have relied on Gertz for constitutional protection for opinions
see infra note 155.
16. See Note, supra note 13, at 815-16.
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statements of fact.' 7 The strict liability standard did not break
communication down into neatly classified groups or consider
the status of the defamed person. 18 Defamatory communica-
tions were actionable so long as the plaintiff could show the
defendant disseminated a statement to a third person that low-
ered the reputation of the plaintiff "in the estimation of the
community or ... deter[red] third persons from associating or
dealing with him."' 19 Proof of falsity was not required; as a
matter of law, injury to reputation was irrebuttably pre-
sumed. 20 Whether the statement was deemed fact or opinion
was irrelevant because mere expressions of opinion were also
actionable. 2 ' The defendant incurred liability unless sufficient
proof was offered to show that the statement was either true or
privileged.22
Fearing strict liability would chill public debate, the qualified
17. See Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 (1966); Note, Protection of Reputation
Versus Freedom of Expression: Striking a Manageable Compromise in the Tort of Defamation, 63
S. CAL. L. REV. 435, 440-42 (1990).
18. There are four elements necessary to sustain a defamation action under the
common law: (1) the statement must be false and defamatory; (2) the statement
must involve a nonprivileged communication to a third party; (3) the fault of the
defendant must pass a negligence threshold; and (4) either the statement must be
actionable irrespective of special harm or the publication must have caused special
harm. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (1977).
Today, the law of defamation is riddled with a variety of categorical distinctions.
Beginning in 1964 with New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), the courts
have classified plaintiffs as private figures, public figures, public officials and limited
purpose public figures. Defendants are classified as media and nonmedia. In addi-
tion to the nature of the parties, the type of speech is also classified. For example,
not only do courts classify facts and opinions, they also consider if the speech is a
matter of public concern. Even the application of "actual malice" adds additional
dimension (and often confusion) to the law of defamation.
As to whether these distinctions actually serve their intended purpose,
Meiklejohn argues that "things ought never to have got to this pass where freedom of
thought and expression depend on distinctions as thin as a hair." Meiklejohn, supra
note 9, at 253 n.26 (citation omitted).
19. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 comment a (1977); see also Mencher
v. Chesley, 297 N.Y. 94, 100, 75 N.E.2d 257, 259 (1947).
20. See Eaton, The American Law of Defamation Through Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.
and Beyond: An Analytical Primer, 61 VA. L. REV. 1349, 1353 (1975). A claim for defa-
mation would also stand despite the apparent impossibility of determining a state-
ment's truth or falsity. Note, supra note 13, at 811.
21. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695, 2702 (1990) (calling
attention to the RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 565-567 (1938)). Statements of opinion
were not constitutionally protected. See Comment, Statements of Fact, Statements of
Opinion, and the First Amendment, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 1001, 1004 (1986).
22. Eaton, supra, note 20, at 1353 n.16 ("Truth was a complete defense at com-
mon law."); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 (1977).
(Vol. 17
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privilege of fair comment was added to the law of defamation
as an affirmative defense. 23 Fair comment evolved as the vehi-
cle for protecting statements of opinion in the context of val-
ued public debate. 24  The fair comment privilege generally
required proof of four elements: (1) the statement must con-
cern a matter of public concern; (2) the statement must be
based on true or privileged facts either set forth in the publica-
tion or generally known to the public; (3) the statement must
represent the actual opinion of the critic; and (4) the state-
ment must not have been made for the purpose of causing
harm to the one criticized. 25 The rationale of the fair comment
privilege stemmed from the ideas that criticism stimulates the
intellect of society, and that the public is entitled to an array of
opinions.2 6  The fair comment privilege presented the
Supreme Court with the first opportunity to draw a fundamen-
tal distinction between fact and opinion.27
After the 1974 United States Supreme Court case Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc. ,28 the majority of jurisdictions viewed the
fact-opinion distinction as a necessary step in extending first
amendment protection. Justice Powell's dictum elevated the
common law fair comment privilege to a constitutional level:2 9
Under the First Amendment, there is no such thing as a
false idea. However pernicious an opinion may seem, we
depend for its correction not on the conscience of judges
and juries but on the competition of other ideas. But there
23. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2703. Seegenerally RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 606-610
(1938); Keeton, Defamation and Freedom of the Press, 54 TEx. L. REV. 1221, 1223, 1240
(1976); Comment, supra note 21, at 1002-03.
24. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2703; see also Halpern, Of Libel, Language, and Law: New
York Times v. Sullivan at Twenty-Five, 68 N.C.L. REV. 273, 300-01 n.153 (1990); Note,
The Fact-Opinion Distinction in First Amendment Libel Law: The Need for a Bright-Line Rule,
72 GEO. L.J. 1817 (1984); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 606 (1938) (Section 566 of the
second RESTATEMENT supersedes section 606 of the first RESTATEMENT.).
The second RESTATEMENT was an attempt by the American Law Institute to ac-
commodate Gertz. For a comparison of the two RESTATEMENT positions, see Christie,
Defamatory Opinions and the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 75 MIcH. L. REV. 1621 (1977).
25. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 606 comments a-d (1938). For a general dis-
cussion of the fair comment privilege, see Note, Fair Comment, 62 HARV. L. REV. 1207
(1949).
26. Note, supra note 24, at 1819.
27. Comment, supra note 21, at 1003.
28. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
29. For a discussion of the interpretation ofJustice Powell's statement, see infra
text accompanying notes 155-68.
1991]
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is no constitutional value in false statements of fact.3 °
Equating the word "opinion" with the word "idea," courts in
every jurisdiction interpreted the statement to stand for two
principles: (1) that an unqualified first amendment privilege
exists for opinions; and (2) that the fact-opinion distinction is
constitutionally required. 1 Courts and commentators have
subsequently struggled to formulate discernable boundaries to
guide the fact-opinion distinction. 2
B. Fact-Opinion Distinction in the Eighth Circuit
The Eighth Circuit attempted to formulate coherent guide-
lines for separating communicated fact from opinion. Two
tests have been used to assist in making the distinction. First,
the Eighth Circuit employed the Restatement (Second) of Torts
test, focusing on undisclosed defamatory facts.33 Following
Olman v. Evans,3 4 the Eighth Circuit set aside the Restatement
test and adopted the "totality of the circumstances" test, exam-
ining the total context in which the statement was uttered. 5
1. The Restatement of Torts Test
Several jurisdictions adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts
30. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. at 339-40 (citing New York Times v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964)).
31. See Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 978 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc), cert. denied,
471 U.S. 1127 (1985) (noting the overwhelming "post-Gertz authority that the distinc-
tion between opinion and fact is [constitutionally required as] a matter of law").
32. See Comment, supra note 21, at 1003.
33. See Lauderback v. American Broadcasting Co., 741 F.2d 193, 195 (8th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1190 (1985) ("[Sltatements clothed as opinion which im-
ply that they are based on undisclosed, defamatory facts are not protected."); see also
Halpern, supra note 24, at 307; Note, The Illusion of the Fact-Opinion Distinction in Defa-
mation Law, 39 CASE W. RES. 867, 868 n.6 (1988-1989) (listing cases finding a privi-
lege for opinion).
For a complete discussion of the RESTATEMENT test and a list of cases that used
the test to distinguish fact from opinion, see Comment, supra note 21, at 1013.
34. 750 F.2d 970 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
35. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. In a 70-page decision, with seven
different opinions, Olman v. Evans illustrates the difficulty in distinguishing fact from
opinion. Judge Starr, writing for the court, formulated the "totality of the circum-
stances" test:
First, we will analyze the common usage or meaning of the specific language
of the challenged statement .... Second, we will consider the statement's
verifiability-is the statement capable of being objectively characterized as
true or false? . .. Third .... we will consider the full context of the state-
ment-the entire article or column. ... Finally, we will consider the broader
context or setting in which the statement appears.
Ollman, 750 F.2d at 979.
[Vol. 17
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test to distinguish fact from opinion.3 6 Section 566 of the Re-
statement provides: "A defamatory communication may consist
of a statement in the form of an opinion, but a statement of
this nature is actionable only if it implies the allegation of un-
disclosed defamatory facts as the basis for the opinion. '3 7 The
Restatement analysis turns on the distinction between "pure"
opinion and "mixed" opinion, focusing on the effect the state-
ment has on the recipient.
38
Under the Restatement test, "pure" opinions are absolutely
privileged. 39 "Pure" opinions are statements made in conjunc-
tion with a complete disclosure of the facts, or statements com-
municated to an audience already aware of the facts on which
the opinion is based.40 The utterance must portray the
speaker's personal view on the stated or known facts, rather
than asserting an additional objective fact.4 ' If the prefaced
facts from which the speaker draws the opinion are true, the
utterance is absolutely protected no matter how caustic or de-
rogatory the comment.42
The Restatement test requires the court to determine as a mat-
ter of law whether the statement is a "mixed" opinion, subject
36. See, e.g., Lauderback, 741 F.2d at 193; Lewis v. Time Inc., 710 F.2d 549 (9th
Cir. 1983); Avins v. White, 627 F.2d 637 (3d Cir. 1980); Yancey v. Hamilton, 786
S.W.2d 854 (Ky. 1989); Healy v. New England Newspapers, Inc., 520 A.2d 147 (R.I.
1987). See generally Topical Surveys-Tort Law: Defamatory Opinions Actionable if Based
upon Defamatory Facts, 22 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 523 (1988).
Some courts adopted jurisdictional variations on the RESTATEMENT approach.
See Ollman, 750 F.2d at 1022 (Robinson, J., dissenting in part) (analyzing "hybrid"
opinions).
37. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 (1977).
38. Id. § 566 comment b; see also, Comment, supra note 21, at 1013.
39. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 (1977). The second RESTATEMENT
incorporated the opinion privilege whereas the first RESTATEMENT spoke of fair com-
ment. The first RESTATEMENT was modified as a result of Gertz, and now affords com-
plete protection to all "pure" opinions. Compare RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 606
(1938) with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 (1977); see also Bruno v. New
York News, Inc., 89 A.D.2d 260, 264, 456 N.Y.S.2d 837, 840 (1982) (holding that
expressions of opinion are protected when supported by objective facts).
40. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 comment b (1977); see also Orr v.
Argus-Press Co., 586 F.2d 1108, 1114-15 (6th Cir. 1978) (discussing the distinction
between opinions based on revealed facts and opinions based on unrevealed facts),
cert. denied, 440 U.S. 960 (1979); Rinaldi v. Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 42 N.Y.2d
369, 380, 366 N.E.2d 1299, 1306, 397 N.Y.S.2d 943, 950-51 (1976) (finding opinions
to be constitutionally protected so long as the underlying facts are revealed), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 969 (1977).
41. R. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 6.04[1] (1991).
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to liability, or a "pure" opinion, which is protected from liabil-
ity." 3 "Mixed" opinions imply the existence of undisclosed
facts as the basis for the opinion.44 When the factual basis for
the speaker's statement is not disclosed, the speaker incurs lia-
bility if the statement implies the existence of defamatory
facts.4 5 With respect to the scope of "mixed" opinions, the
Supreme Court has not yet determined whether a speaker will
be held liable for failing to fully disclose all the underlying
facts.4 6 The Court has merely determined that the Restatement
test imposes liability when the recipient infers undisclosed de-
famatory facts as the basis for the opinion.
Following Gertz, the Eighth Circuit adopted an analysis simi-
lar to that of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Under the Eight
Circuit's Restatement analysis, given complete disclosure of the
circumstances and viewed in their entire context, opinions
which appeared to be based on undisclosed defamatory facts
do not warrant first amendment protection.4 7 Although the
speaker is required to reveal the factual basis for inferences,
the Eighth Circuit noted that not all information favorable to
the plaintiff need be disclosed.4" However, the audience must
have been given ample and fair opportunity to judge the mean-
ing of the message.4 9 The Eighth Circuit also recognized that
pre-existing constitutional doctrines provide additional safe-
guards against "unfounded statements clothed as fact."
50
Constitutional safeguards coupled with a focus on undisclosed
defamatory fact provided the Eighth Circuit with the means to
address statements interpreted as either fact or opinion.5
43. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 comment c (1977).
44. R. SMOLLA, supra note 41, at § 6.04[2] (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 566 comment b (1977)).
45. Id.
46. Comment, supra note 21, at 1015.
47. Lauderback v. American Broadcasting Co., 741 F.2d 193, 198 (8th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1190 (1985).
48. See Brown v. Herald Co., 698 F.2d 949, 951 (8th Cir. 1983) (Even though
complimentary material was at the newspaper's disposal, the newspaper did not act
with "actual malice.").
49. See Treutler v. Meredith Corp., 455 F.2d 255, 258-59 (8th Cir. 1972) (The
fact that the audience had an opportunity to make its own evaluation was a significant
factor in determining whether the language was defamatory.).
50. Lauderback, 741 F.2d at 195-96.
51. See id. ("[S]tatements clothed as opinion which imply that they are based on
undisclosed, defamatory facts are not protected.").
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2. The Evolution of the Eighth Circuit's "Totality of the
Circumstances" Test
The Eighth Circuit set aside the modified Restatement analysis
inJanklow v. Newsweek, Inc. 52 TheJanklow court adopted a mod-
ified "totality of the circumstances" test first articulated in
Olman v. Evans.5' Both tests distinguished absolutely pro-
tected opinions from false statements of fact.5 4 In Janklow,
Newsweek magazine published an article tracing the history of
the relationship between Dennis Banks, an American Indian
activist, and South Dakota Governor William Janklow. The ar-
ticle described the events in their relationship as follows:
Along the way, Banks made a dangerous enemy-William
Janklow. Their feud started in 1974, when Banks brought
charges against Janklow in a tribal court for assault. A 15-
year-old Indian girl who baby-sat forJanklow's children had
claimed that he raped her in 1969. Federal officials found
insufficient evidence to prosecute, but Banks persuaded the
Rosebud Sioux chiefs to reopen the case under tribal law.
Janklow, who was running for election as state attorney gen-
eral at the time refused to appear for the trial. But the tribal
court found "probable cause" to believe the charges and
barred Janklow from practicing law on the reservation.
Eight months later Janklow-who had won his election de-
spite the messy publicity-was prosecuting Banks. And his
case-based on the 1973 Custer riot-was successful.55
52. 788 F.2d 1300, 1301 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 883 (1986).
53. Id. at 1302-03 (citing Olman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 975, 981-83, 1002-05
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985)). In Oilman, a conserva-
tive columnist accused a university professor of attempting "to convert students to
socialism" and of using the classroom to prepare for a "revolution." Oilman, 750
F.2d at 971-73. The columnist also quoted another professor who strongly implied
that the plaintiff-professor "lack[ed] a reputation in his field as [a] scholar." Id. The
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia determined that all of the statements
constituted protected opinion as a matter of law. Id. at 973-74.
54. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 (1977) with Oilman, 750 F.2d
at 993. In a concurring opinion in Oilman, Judge Robert Bork introduced the modi-
fied version of the "totality of the circumstances" test adopted by the Eighth Circuit.
Oilman, 750 F.2d at 1002-05 (Bork, J., concurring). Prior to Milkovich, several com-
mentators suggested that Judge Bork's modifications provided a more credible re-
view of the fact-opinion distinction. Commentators also noted that the modified test
was more likely to find disputed statements to be opinion. See, e.g., Note, Classification
of an Alleged Defamation as an Actionable Statement of Fact or as a Constitutionally Protected
Expression of Opinion: Determined by the "Totality of the Circumstances" or by the Predilections
of the Judge?, 12 U. DAYTON L. REV. 597, 619-20 (1987).
55. Janklow v. Newsweek, Inc., 759 F.2d 644, 655 (8th Cir. 1985), modified on
reh'g, 788 F.2d 1300 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 883 (1986).
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Janklow argued that the article implied he began prosecut-
ing Banks out of revenge.56 The Janklow court's analysis was
based on the Oilman four-part test.57 The court emphasized
that no one factor was dispositive; the ultimate decision must
internalize "all the circumstances" involved.58 First, the court
looked at the precision and specificity of the disputed state-
ment, noting that imprecise statements were more likely to be
expressions of opinion.59  Second, the court questioned
whether the statements were verifiable.60 Third, the court ad-
ded a "literary" aspect to Judge Starr's "social context" in
Olman, focusing on the publication, style, use of cautionary
language, and intended audience of the statements. 6' Fourth,
the court expanded the "broader context" review of Olman to
include and focus on "the public or political arena in which the
statement is made and whether the statement implicates core
values of the First Amendment. ' 62 In applying the four-part
"totality of the circumstances" test, the court injanklow classi-
fied Newsweek's statements as "opinion," fully protected
56. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendant magazine.
Id. at 646. On appeal, a divided panel reversed and held "the meaning that can be
drawn from the Newsweek article-that Janklow did not commence prosecuting
Banks until after Banks attempted to bring him to justice for the alleged rape of an
Indian girl-is factual." Id. at 652. The Eighth Circuit subsequently granted News-
week's petition for rehearing en banc. Janklow, 788 F.2d 1300, 1301 (8th Cir.) (en
banc), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 883 (1986).
57. See Olman, 750 F.2d at 979. The Supreme Court succinctly described the
four Olman factors as "(1) 'the specific language used'; (2) 'whether the statement is
verifiable'; (3) 'the general context of the statement'; and (4) 'the broader context in
which the statement appeared.'" Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695,
2700 (1990) (quoting Scott v. News-Herald, 25 Ohio St. 3d 243, 250, 496 N.E.2d
699, 706 (1986)).
58. Janklow, 788 F.2d at 1302.
59. Id. (noting that vague or imprecise statements do not have the characteristics
of a statement of fact). The court found the disputed statements to be "imprecise,
unverifiable, presented in a forum where spirited writing is expected, and involv[ing]
criticism of the motives and intentions of a public official." Id. at 1305.
60. Id. "If a statement can not plausibly be verified, it cannot be seen as 'fact.'"
Id. at 1302.
61. Id. at 1302-03. The court inJanklow emphasized reviewing the context in
which the statement was made. The court pointed out that magazines are often "col-
orful" and contain feisty language, even to a greater degree than daily newspapers.
Under the third part of the four-part test, the court concluded that the statements at
issue were presented in a forum where spirited writing is expected. Id. at 1304-05.
62. Id. at 1303; see also Oilman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 1016 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en
banc) (MacKinnon, J., concurring), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985). " '[T]he con-
cept of a public, political arena' is crucial to a proper understanding of [this case]."
Id. (quoting Judge Bork's concurring opinion.).
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under the first amendment. 63
Janklow contributed to the myriad of favorable media judg-
ments, primarily as a result of two factors. First, the four-part
test gave the court great flexibility to classify disputed state-
ments as opinion.' Second, after statements were classified as
opinion, courts relied on Gertz to give opinions the same pro-
tection as ideas under the first amendment. The Gertz dicta be-
came "the opening salvo in all arguments for protection from
defamation actions on the ground of opinion, even though the
case did not remotely concern the question. '65 However, the
Supreme Court's decision in Milkovich could significantly re-
duce media victories; the press may no longer enjoy the pro-
tections provided by the expansive boundaries of the opinion
defense.66
II. MILKOVICH v. LORAIN JOURNAL Co.: THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT ADDRESSES THE OPINION PRIVILEGE
A. Background
Michael Milkovich, Sr., a high school wrestling coach, and H.
Don Scott, a school superintendent, filed separate libel suits
against an Ohio newspaper and its reporter alleging that they
were falsely accused of perjury in the same newspaper col-
umn.67 The two lawsuits resulted in an "odyssey of litigation"
and conflicting results when they both reached the Ohio
Supreme Court.6" The facts and judicial proceedings in the
two cases illustrate how the Ohio Supreme Court struggled to
63. Janhlow, 788 F.2d at 1305.
64. See Note, supra note 55, at 619-20 (discussing deference as an inherent weak-
ness of the four-part test).
65. Cianci v. New Times Publishing Co., 639 F.2d 54, 61 (2d Cir. 1980).
66. See Scheetz v. Morning Call, Inc., 747 F. Supp 1515, 1524 n.13 (E.D. Pa.
1990) (recognizing that Milkovih will act as a restraint on the media).
67. Milkovich v. News-Herald, 15 Ohio St. 3d 292, 473 N.E.2d 1191 (1984) (per
curiam) (4-3 decision), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 954 (1985) (overruled in part in Scott v.
News-Herald, 25 Ohio St. 3d 243, 496 N.E.2d 699 (1986) (4-3 decision)).
68. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695, 2698 (1990). Both Scott
and Milkovich commenced independent suits based on the same newspaper column.
In 1984, the Ohio Supreme Court found the statements in the column to be "factual
assertions as a matter of law." Milkovich, 15 Ohio St. 3d at 298, 473 N.E.2d at 1196-
97. The same set of facts appeared before the Ohio Supreme Court 20 months later
and the court concluded that the statements in the column were "constitutionally
protected opinion." Scott, 25 Ohio St. 3d at 254, 496 N.E.2d at 709.
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distinguish actionable fact from protected opinion.6 9
In 1974, Milkovich's wrestling team was involved in an alter-
cation at a home match with a competing team.7 ° Several peo-
ple were injured when a fight broke out between the teams and
the spectators during a meet. 7' As a result, the Ohio High
School Athletic Association (Athletic Association) called ad-
ministrative hearings concerning the altercation. 72 The Ath-
letic Association subsequently censured coach Milkovich for
his conduct at the match, placed the team on probation for one
year, and suspended them from the 1975 state tournament.73
Following the Athletic Association's disciplinary ruling, sev-
eral wrestlers and their parents brought suit against the Ath-
letic Association alleging they were denied due process in the
hearings.74 In the ensuing proceeding, both Milkovich and
Scott testified regarding the altercation and their behavior.
75
The Ohio Court of Common Pleas overturned the Athletic As-
sociation's ruling on due process grounds.
76
The day after the court rendered its decision, Theodore
Diadiun wrote a column in the sports section of the News-Her-
ald headlined "Maple beat the law with the 'big lie.' ,77
Diadiun's photograph, along with the words "TD Says" ap-
peared beneath the headline and the carryover page read
"Diadiun says Maple told a lie." ' 78 The column implied that
Milkovich and Scott lied at the Athletic Association hearing.
79
Diadiun wrote: "Anyone who attended the meet, whether he
be from Maple Heights, Mentor, or impartial observer, knows
in his heart that Milkovich and Scott lied at the hearing after
each having given his solemn oath to tell the truth." 80
69. See generally Note, supra note 13 (discussing the Ohio Supreme Court's deci-
sions on the fact-opinion issue).
70. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2698. Apparently, a fight broke out between specta-
tors and team members after a wrestler was disqualified by the referee. Milkovich, 15
Ohio St. at 292, 473 N.E.2d at 1192.
71. Milkovich, 15 Ohio St. 3d at 292, 473 N.E.2d at 1192.







79. Id. Diadiun attended both the match and the Athletic Association hearings.
Milkovich, 15 Ohio St. 3d at 292, 473 N.E.2d at 1192.
80. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2698.
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Milkovich's suit proceeded to trial first. Milkovich alleged
that eight additional passages, along with the headline, harmed
him "directly in his life-time occupation of coach and teacher,
and constituted libel per se." 8 ' The Ohio Court of Common
Pleas granted a directed verdict for News-Herald and Diadiun
on the grounds that Milkovich failed to meet the New York Times
"actual malice" standard. 2 The Ohio Court of Appeals re-
versed and remanded, stating that Milkovich had set forth suf-
ficient evidence of actual malice.8 3 The defendants appealed
the court of appeals' holding. The Ohio Supreme Court dis-
missed the case for want of a substantial constitutional ques-
tion and the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari.84
On remand, the Ohio Court of Common Pleas granted sum-
mary judgment to the defendants. The court relied on Gertz
for the proposition that the statements were constitutionally
protected opinion, and alternatively, that Milkovich "failed to
make out a prima facie case of actual malice" required for pub-
lic figures.8 5 The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed.8 6 However,
the Ohio Supreme Court reversed and remanded on two
81. Id. at 2699-700. The eight other alleged defamatory passages within the arti-
cle read:
, '[A] lesson was learned (or relearned) yesterday by the student body
of Maple Heights High School, and by anyone who attended the Maple-
Mentor wrestling meet of last Feb. 8.
" 'A lesson which, sadly, in view of the events of the past year, is well
they learned early.
" 'It is simply this: If you get in a jam, lie your way out.
"'If you're successful enough, and powerful enough, and can sound
sincere enough, you stand an excellent chance of making the lie stand up,
regardless of what really happened.
"'The teachers responsible were mainly Maple wrestling coach, Mike
Milkovich, and former superintendent of schools, H. Donald Scott.
'But they got away with it.
"'Is that the kind of lesson we want our young people learning from
their high school administrators and coaches?
"'I think not.' "
Id. at 2698 (quoting Milkovich v. News-Herald, 46 Ohio App. 3d 20, 21, 545 N.E.2d
1320, 1321-22). The Court also reprinted the entire article as it appeared in the
News-Herald. Id. at 2698 n.3.
82. Id. at 2700. In New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), the
Supreme Court held that a public figure must prove "actual malice" before a media
defendant can be held liable for defamation. Id. at 283. For a description of the New
York Times "actual malice" standard, see infra notes 94-127.
83. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 65 Ohio App. 2d 143, 416 N.E.2d 662, 666-
67 (1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 966 (1988).
84. Lorain Journal Co. v. Milkovich, 449 U.S. 966 (1980).
85. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2700.
86. Milkovich v. News-Herald, No. 9-012 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 30, 1983) (1983
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grounds.8 7 First, the court held that petitioner was neither a
public figure nor a public official. 8 Second, the court deter-
mined that, as a matter of law, the statements in question were
factual assertions and not protected opinions.8 9 The United
States Supreme Court again denied certiorari.90
Almost two years after Milkovich, the Ohio Supreme Court in
Scott produced an antithesis on the fact-opinion distinction. 9'
Although the court found the statements to be actionable in
Milkovich, seven separate opinions and a four-three decision in
Scott produced a plurality that held the statements to be consti-
tutionally protected opinion.92 Interestingly, the Scott decision
followed a change in the judicial makeup of the Ohio Supreme
Court. The Ohio Court of Appeals, hearing Milkovich on re-
mand, considered itself bound by the decision in Scott and con-
cluded that "as a matter of law .... the article in question was
constitutionally protected opinion."9 3  The Ohio Supreme
Court dismissed Milkovich's appeal for want of a substantial
WESTLAW 6119), rev'd, 15 Ohio St. 3d 292, 473 N.E.2d 1191 (1984) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 954 (1985).
87. Milkovich v. News-Herald, 15 Ohio St. 3d 292, 473 N.E.2d 1191 (1984) (per
curiam).
88. Id. at 294-99, 473 N.E.2d at 1193-96.
89. Id at 299-300, 473 N.E.2d at 1196-97. Although the court found the state-
ments in question to be factual assertions, the court did not set forth a standard or
test for use in distinguishing fact from opinion. The court's reasoning was based on
the finding that the article failed to inform the reader that the author's statements
were merely opinion. In addition, the court found that "[t]he plain import of the
author's assertions is that Milkovich, inter alia, committed the crime of perjury in a
court of law." Id. at 300, 473 N.E.2d at 1197.
90. Lorain Journal Co. v. Milkovich, 474 U.S. 953 (1985).
91. Scott v. News-Herald, 25 Ohio St. 3d 243, 496 N.E.2d 699 (1986) (4-3
decision).
92. Id. Milkovich and Scott illustrate the difficulty courts have in coming to a uni-
form conclusion on the fact-opinion distinction. The "totality of the circumstances"
test provided the court with a framework to guide the fact-opinion distinction. See
supra notes 53-67 and accompanying text (discussing the "totality of the circum-
stances" test).
Although the first two factors of the test, "specific language" and "verifiability,"
were arguably in favor of actionable fact, the court afforded great weight to the last
two factors, "general context" and "broader context." The court also pointed to the
"large caption 'TD Says' "and concluded that even the most naive reader would view
the column as opinion rather than fact. Within the article's "broader context," the
court stated that sports columns are often "a traditional haven for cajoling, invective,
and hyperbole,"-characteristics of an opinion. Id. at 252-54, 496 N.E.2d at 708.
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constitutional question.94 These two conflicting decisions fi-
nally prompted the United States Supreme Court to address
the issues surrounding a recognized constitutional exception
for opinions after two previous attempts at certiorari and fif-
teen years of litigation.95
B. The United States Supreme Court's Holding in Milkovich
1. Reliance on Existing Constitutional Doctrines for First
Amendment Protection
Milkovich began with a dissertation on the constitutional
evolution and relevant Supreme Court doctrines that comprise
the established safeguards of first amendment protection.9 6
The Court held that existing constitutional and Supreme
Court doctrines adequately allow for freedom of expression
without "the creation of an artificial dichotomy between 'opin-
ion' and fact." '97 The safeguards include constitutional limita-
tions on the parties involved, the subject matter of the
communication, the particular type of speech involved and re-
view of the record at the appellate level.98
a. Public Official/Public Figure/Public Concern
The Court in Milkovich relied on existing Supreme Court
doctrines to provide constitutional limitations and to ensure
that culpability requirements remain in the law of defama-
tion.99 The status of the plaintiff and the subject matter of the
communication affect the scope of first amendment protection.
Milkovich reiterates these Supreme Court doctrines.
The Milkovich Court noted that New York Times v. Sullivan 1oo
94. Milkovich v. News-Herald, 46 Ohio St. 3d 707, 540 N.E.2d 724 (1989).
95. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 863 (1990).
96. Milkovich v. Lorain journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695, 2703-05 (1990). The scope
of this Comment on relevant Supreme Court doctrines does not purport to offer an
extensive analysis, but merely provides a relevant summary of the Supreme Court
doctrines as they relate to Milhovich.
97. Id. at 2706.
98. See infra notes 108-54 and accompanying text.
99. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2706-07.
100. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). During a civil right uprising in the south, the police
commissioner brought a libel action against four Alabama clergymen and the New
York Times. The allegedly defamatory publication, a full page advertisement, con-
tained inaccuracies regarding certain details of police conduct toward civil rights
demonstrators. The Court found the police commissioner to be a public official who
had to prove actual malice. Id. at 279-80. For a complete analysis and discussion of
1991]
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was the first Supreme Court case to place defamation within
the scope of first amendment protection.' ' New York Times
held that, to prevail in a defamation claim, a public official
must prove "that the statement was made with 'actual mal-
ice'-that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless
disregard of whether it was false or not."'10 2 Our democratic
form of government relies on the acts of public officials as they
execute public duties, and criticism is justified to promote
"uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" public debate.'0 "
Courts recognize the importance of disseminating factual in-
formation as it relates to the operation of our government. 04
The actual malice standard removes any fear that criticism of
public officials would cease unless the critic could guarantee
the truth of his factual assertions. 0 5 Following New York Times,
courts granted the necessary "breathing space" 1°6 to protect
speech regarding public officials, especially those involved in
governmental affairs.'1
7
The consolidated opinions of Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts 'o'
and Associated Press v. Walker 109 extended the New York Times ac-
New York Times, see Halpern, supra note 24 (discussing New York Times, its progeny and
the strengths and weaknesses of the first Supreme Court case to address the process
of constitutionalization of defamation).
101. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2703 (discussing New York Times, 376 U.S. at 292
n.30). Prior to New York Times, libel was considered beyond the reach of first amend-
ment protection. Id.
102. Id. at 2703 (quoting New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80).
103. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 270.
104. See id. at 271-79 (outlining the reasoning behind allowing open criticism of
public officials).
105. Id at 279; see also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 334 (1974).
106. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 271-72.
107. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695, 2703 (1990); see also New
York Times, 376 U.S. at 271-79; Gertz, 418 U.S. at 334. The Gertz decision further
defined public figures as general purpose and limited purpose public figures. Id. at
351. A general purpose public figure is one who, independent of the lawsuit, has
attained general notoriety within the community. A limited purpose public figure is
one who has not voluntarily "thrust himself into the vortex" of the litigation. Id. at
352; see also Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publications, Inc., 627 F.2d 1287, 1294, 1296
(D.C. Cir. 1979) (finding the plaintiff, who was the president of the second largest
corporation in the country and active in shaping its policies, to be a limited purpose
public figure), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 898 (1980). In a recent case the Supreme Court
stated, "Today, there is no question that public figure libel cases are controlled by
the New York Times standard." Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton,
491 U.S. 657, 666 (1989).
108. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
109. 388 U.S. 130 (1967) (Butts and Walker were decided together). See generally
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tual malice standard to public figures." 0 The plaintiffs in these
cases were prominent individuals in their respective communi-
ties, rather than public officials."'I Expanding the New York
Times rationale, the Court in Butts recognized that persons
other than public officials, perhaps through fame or notoriety,
often exercise significant authority on important societal is-
sues.112 The central ideas of uninhibited debate, constructive
criticism, and a citizen's need for information in self-govern-
ment are as important to the free discussion concerning the
conduct of these individuals as they are to public officials. ,'3
Constitutional developments in defamation law shifted in
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.' 14 where the Court balanced the
reputation of a private figure against statements of public con-
cern. The Court held that freedom of expression outweighed
the private figure's interest in reputation, shifting the "status
of the plaintiff" focus to whether the statement is one of public
concern. '15
The Court subsequently refused to afford the vast deference
to public concern in Gertz, concluding that "the New York Times
malice standard was inappropriate for a private person at-
tempting to prove he was defamed on matters of public inter-
Kalven, The Reasonable Man and the First Amendment: Hill, Butts and Walker, 1967 Sup.
CT. REV. 267 (providing an extensive analysis of the Butts and Walker decisions).
110. 388 U.S. at 155.
111. Butts, 388 U.S. at 154-55. Both Butts and Walker had "commanded sufficient
continuing public interest" prior to the lawsuit to qualify them as public figures. Id
at 155. In Butts, the Saturday Evening Post published an article that accused the
plaintiff, the head football coach at the University of Georgia, of conspiring with
Coach "Bear" Bryant, head football coach at the University of Alabama, to "fix" a
football game. Id. at 136. The Court found the plaintiff to be a public figure and
imposed the "actual malice" standard on him. Id. at 154. In Walker, a famous retired
army general was accused of leading a charge against federal marshals who were
enforcing the court-ordered enrollment of the first black at the University of Missis-
sippi. Id. at 140.
112. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 336-37 (1974) (quoting Butts, 388
U.S. at 163-64).
113. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695, 2703 (1990) (citing Butts,
388 U.S. at 164). But see Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 454-55, 461 (1976)
(holding that the plaintiff was a private figure, even though she was prominent in
social circles, and at times even sought publicity).
114. 403 U.S. 29 (1971). Rosenbloom involved a radio news report of a police cam-
paign to enforce an obscenity law. The report ultimately resulted in the plaintiff's
arrest for selling obscene material. The plaintiff later sued for harm to his reputation
when the material was judged not to be obscene. Id. at 35-36.
115. Id. at 44.
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est."' "1 6 In shifting the focus back to the status of the plaintiff,
the Gertz Court held that a private figure did not have to meet
the New York Times actual malice standard."
i7
The Court explained that because public officials and figures
have access to the channels of communication in a manner that
is not necessarily available to a private individual, private
figures do not have the same opportunities to rebut defama-
tory statements."' More importantly, "public officials and
public figures have voluntarily exposed themselves to in-
creased risk of injury from defamatory falsehood concerning
them. No such assumption is justified with respect to a private
individual."" 9
Nonetheless, the Court in Gertz indicated its belief that "cer-
tain significant constitutional protections were warranted in
this area" by returning to a test that focused on the status of
the plaintiff. 20 First, Gertz limited a state's latitude in defining
an appropriate standard of liability when a private figure plain-
tiff sues a media defendant.' 2 ' Gertz requires some showing of
fault before liability can be imposed. 122 Requiring a showing
of fault acknowledges "the legitimate state interest in compen-
sating private individuals for wrongful injury to reputation, yet
shields the press and broadcast media from the rigors of strict
liability for defamation."' l2 1 Second, Gertz limited damages to
actual injury for all cases absent a showing of actual malice.
124
When the plaintiff claims punitive damages, a state may not
permit recovery unless the New York Times actual malice stan-
dard has been satisfied.' 25 The Court's limitations on damages
116. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2704; see also Note, supra note 17, at 445-46 (asserting
the proposition that the Court felt that a "public interest" test would allow the media
to define the speech to be protected because public interest would hinge on
exposure).
117. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 331 n.4 (1974).
118. "Public officials and public figures usually enjoy significantly greater access
to the channels of effective communication and hence have a more realistic opportu-
nity to counteract false statements than private individuals normally enjoy." Id at
344.
119. Id. at 345.
120. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2704.
121. States can define an appropriate standard so long as they do not impose strict
liability. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347.
122. Id. at 347-48.
123. Id. at 348.
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reflects an effort to curb runaway jury verdicts, and in turn pre-
vent the media from self-censorship. 2
6
Following Gertz, the Supreme Court continued to develop
the law of defamation. In Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v.
Hepps,' 27 the Court shifted the burden of proof to the plaintiff,
holding that a private figure plaintiff must prove that state-
ments of public concern made by a media defendant are
false.' 28 The Court noted that the Constitution favors free
speech and public debate. To encourage people to exercise
their first amendment rights, the Court "fashioned 'a constitu-
tional requirement that the plaintiff bear the burden of show-
ing falsity, as well as fault, before receiving damages.' ,,t29 The
Court in Milkovich noted that "Hepps ensures that a statement
of opinion relating to matters of public concern which does not
contain a provably false factual connotation will receive full
constitutional protection."'
' 30
Generally, if the plaintiff is a public official, a public figure,
or the speech is a matter of public concern, courts afford the
defendant a greater degree of protection for free speech.
13
The Milkovich Court held that the culpability requirements and
constitutional limitations of New York Times, Butts, Gertz, and
their progeny "ensure that debate on public issues remains
'uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.' "132
b. Types of Speech
The Milkovich Court relied on a trilogy of Supreme Court
cases to illustrate the appropriate common law protection
given to statements that a reasonable person would not inter-
126. Id. (finding that "jury discretion to award punitive damages unnecessarily ex-
acerbates the danger of media self-censorship").
127. 475 U.S. 767 (1986). In Hepps, Philadelphia Newspaper published a series of
articles alleging that the plaintiff was linked to organized crime and used that link to
influence state governmental processes. Id. at 769.
128. Id. at 768-69. The common-law presumption placed the burden on the de-
fendant to prove that the alleged defamatory statements were true. Id. at 777.
129. Milkovich v. Lorain journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695, 2704 (1990) (quoting Hepps,
475 U.S. at 776).
130. Id. at 2706 (footnote omitted).
131. But see Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749,
755-61 (1985) (holding that the constitutional protections delineated in Gertz were
not applicable to nonmedia defendants).
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pret as stating actual facts.' 3 3 The Court held that protecting
certain types of speech, classified as "imaginative expression"
or "rhetorical hyperbole" further affords adequate protection
for opinions in public debate.
3 4
Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Association v. Bresler is the first
of the three Supreme Court cases relied on in Milkovich to hold
an alleged defamatory statement not actionable because read-
ers understood the statements in a figurative sense.13 5 In Bres-
ler, the plaintiff real estate developer engaged in negotiations
with a local city council to acquire a zoning variance. At the
same time, the city wished to acquire a tract of property owned
by the plaintiff.'3 6 The plaintiff arguably used his ownership of
the land as leverage to receive the zoning variance. '37 Green-
belt News Review accurately reported that some citizens
described the plaintiff's negotiating techniques as "black-
mail." ' 38 The Court characterized the statements as "rhetori-
cal hyperbole" and "vigorous epithet.' 3 9 The Court warned
that the imposition of liability for statements made for effect
rather than literal interpretation, and understood by "even the
most careless reader [as] no more than rhetorical hyperbole"
would chill a free press.'
40
The Milkovich decision acknowledged that Bresler, coupled
with the United States Supreme Court decisions in Old Domin-
ion Branch No. 496, National Association of Letter Carriers v. Aus-
tin 14 and Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell' 42 provide safeguards
133. Id. at 2704-05 (citing Hustler Magazine, Inc., v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50
(1988); Old Dominion Branch No. 496, Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418
U.S. 264 (1974); Greenbelt Coop. Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970)).
134. Id. For a complete discussion on Bresler, Letter Car-ers and Falwell, see Sh-
nieder, A Model for Relating Defamatory "Opinions " to First Amendment Protected "Ideas,"
43 ARK. L. REV. 57, 72-81 (1990).
135. Milhovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2704-05.
136. Greenbelt Coop. Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 7 (1970).
137. Id.
138. Id The plaintiff sued for libel claiming that the report implied the actual
crime of blackmail. l at 8.
139. Id. at 14. The Court held that "the imposition of liability on such a basis was
constitutionally impermissible-that as a matter of constitutional law, the word
'blackmail' in these circumstances was not slander when spoken, and not libel when
reported." Id. at 13.
140. Id. at 14.
141. 418 U.S. 264 (1974). In Letter Carriers, postal workers organized a campaign
to recruit union members. Nonunion members were identified as "scabs" in a union
newsletter. The newsletter quoted a well-known piece of trade union literature that
described a "scab" as a "traitor to his God, his country, his family and his class." Id.
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for statements of "rhetorical hyperbole" and "imaginative ex-
pression."' 43 Opinions used in a loose, figurative sense fall
under first amendment protection no matter how fact-based
the utterance may appear, provided that the plaintiff fails to
prove the statement false.' 44 The published statement must
also depict a complete and accurate account of events. 45 Ad-
ditionally, if the story or report is complete, a reasonable
reader must not interpret the utterance as conveying actual
facts about the person who is the subject of the statement.
46
The Court in Milkovich recognized that Bresler, Letter Carriers
and Falwell guarantee "public debate will not suffer for lack of
'imaginative expression' or the 'rhetorical hyperbole' which
has traditionally added much to the discourse of our
Nation."'
147
c. Independent Examination of the Record
The Milkovich Court also addressed the procedural safe-
at 268. The Court found it "impossible to believe that any reader... would have
understood the newsletter to be charging the appellees with committing the criminal
offense of treason. [The statement] is merely rhetorical hyperbole, a lusty and imagi-
native expression of the contempt felt by union members towards those who refuse
to join." Id. at 285-86. Interestingly, Letter Carriers was decided under federal labor
law, not the first amendment. Id. at 283 n. 15. Also, Letter Carriers was decided on the
same day as Gertz.
142. 485 U.S 46 (1988). In Falwell, a parody of a Campari Liqueur advertisement
in Hustler Magazine portrayed the Reverend Jerry Falwell discussing his "first time."
The double entendre suggested that Jerry Falwell had a "drunken incestuous rendez-
vous with his mother in an outhouse." Id. at 48. The Court rejected ajury award for
Reverend Falwell for the common law tort of intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress, holding that the statement was so outrageous that it "could not reasonably
have been interpreted as stating actual facts about the public figure involved." Id at
50. For a complete discussion of Falwell, see Welkowitz, Trademark Parody After Hus-
tler Magazine v. Falwell, 11 COMM. & L. 65 (1989).
143. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695, 2704-05 (1990).
144. Id.; see also Halpern, supra note 24, at 304 (discussing the concept that opinion
is non-actionable when arising "from the heat of battle, the demands of humor, or
the obviousness of the situation"); Comment, supra note 21, at 1011 (discussing the
basic principles that emerged from Letter Carriers and Bresler).
145. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2704-05 (citing Greenbelt Coop. Publishing Ass'n v.
Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 13 (1970)).
146. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988) (holding that the
first amendment protects offensive speech which cann6t be reasonably interpreted as
stating actual facts); Old Dominion Branch No. 496 v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 285 n.16
(1974) (noting that the plaintiff introduced no evidence that anyone took the use of
the word "traitor" literally).
147. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2706.
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guards in a defamation case.' 4  Appellate courts must inde-
pendently review the factual record in cases that raise first
amendment issues to guarantee that "the judgment does not
constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free expres-
sion. '149 The Court, in Bose Corporation v. Consumers Union of
United States, Inc. ,t10 required independent appellate review to
ensure adequate evidentiary support for a finding of actual
malice in cases involving public officials or private figures.' 5 '
Whether the record supports a finding of actual malice is a
question of law.' 52 The Court's holding can be interpreted to
mean that independent review extends to all cases involving
first amendment issues, because Milkovich was neither a public
official nor a public figure.' 5 3 An independent examination of
the entire record, a procedural device to secure proper appli-
cation of defamation law, substantively protects true state-
ments of opinion.
2. Erasing the Fact-Opinion Dichotomy and Creating a Reasonable
Factfinder Standard
Most federal and state courts relied on the Gertz dicta, in-
terchanging "idea" and "opinion" to extend absolute, consti-
tutional protection for statements labeled "opinion" rather
than "fact." 54 However, the Milkovich Court declined the invi-
148. Id. at 2705, 2707.
149. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2705 (quoting Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United
States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 499 (1985)).
150. 466 U.S. 485 (1984).
151. Id. at 499; see also Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 109 S.
Ct. 2678, 2696 (1989) (holding that the reviewing court must consider the full factual
record).
152. Harte-Hanks Communications, 109 S. Ct. at 2694. "The question whether the
evidence in the record in a defamation case is sufficient to support a finding of actual
malice is a question of law." Id. (citing Bose Corp., 466 U.S. at 510-11).
153. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2700; see also Brelsford & Myers, Expressing Opinions
after Milkovich, 8 COMM. LAW. 32 (1990) (suggesting that an independent review of
all cases raising First Amendment issues protects defendants from liability for state-
ments that are neither probably true nor probably false).
154. The Eighth Circuit interpreted the Gertz dictum as an absolute privilege for
opinions. See, e.g., Price v. Viking Penguin, Inc., 881 F.2d 1426, 1431 (8th Cir. 1989)
(holding that the challenged statements of opinion are absolutely protected), cert.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 757 (1990); Secrist v. Harkin, 874 F.2d 1244, 1248 (8th Cir.) (find-
ing campaign press release statements to be absolutely protected expressions of
opinion), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 324 (1989); Deupree v. Iliff, 860 F.2d 300 (8th Cir.
1988) (finding a statement from a participant on a radio call-in program alleging that
a sex education teacher was deriving sexual gratification from classroom material to
be a statement of opinion);Janklow v. Newsweek, Inc., 788 F.2d 1300, 1302 (8th Cir.)
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tation to create a separate constitutional privilege for state-
ments of opinion.155 Contrary to the interpretation of virtually
every jurisdiction in the United States, Justice Powell's passage
from Gertz was not "intended to create a wholesale defamation
exemption for anything that might be labeled 'opinion.' "156
The Milkovich Court stated that the correct interpretation re-
fers to justice Holmes' "marketplace of ideas" concept. 15 7 Jus-
tice Holmes, in Abrams v. United States,'5 8 advocated the "free
trade in ideas," not opinions, in the marketplace. 159 He stated
that "the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade
in ideas [and] the best test of truth is the power of the thought
to get itself accepted in the competition of the market."' 6 °
The expression and dissemination of ideas is not only a test for
truth but an asset for society. The "marketplace of ideas" con-
cept does not extend to opinions because opinions were not
meant to fall within the scope of first amendment protec-
(en banc) (finding a statement that alleged the former state attorney general prose-
cuted a party out of revenge was a constitutionally protected opinion), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 883 (1986).
Other jurisdictions also interpreted the Gertz dictum as an absolute privilege for
opinion. See, e.g., McCabe v. Rattiner, 814 F.2d 839, 841 (1st Cir. 1987) (recognizing
that courts have interpreted the Gertz dicta as a "bright line demarcating when defa-
mation law must give way to the mandates of the first amendment"); Mr. Chow of
New York v. Ste. Jour Azur S.A., 759 F.2d 219, 223 (2d Cir. 1985) (finding state-
ments about the plaintiff's restaurant, published in a restaurant guide, to be constitu-
tionally protected statements of opinion); Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 990 (D.C.
Cir. 1984) (en banc) (extending the constitutional privilege to statements about
Marxism in a newspaper column because the statements were categorized as expres-
sions of opinion under a four-part test), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985); Baker v.
Los Angeles Herald Examiner, 42 Cal. 3d 254, 259-60, 721 P.2d 87, 90, 228 Cal.
Rptr. 206, 209 (1986) (finding statements in a television program to be statements of
opinion and not actionable), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1032 (1987). For a comprehensive
list of courts that interpreted Gertz as creating a privilege for opinions, see Note, supra
note 13, at 868 n.6.
155. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2705.
156. Id. However, in Cianci v. New Times Publishing Co., 639 F.2d 54 (2d Cir.
1980), Judge Friendly noted that the Gertz dictum "has become the opening salvo in
all arguments for protection from defamation actions on the ground of opinion, even
though the case did not remotely concern the question." Id. at 61 (quoted in
Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2705).
157. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2605 (citing Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616,
630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
158. 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
159. Id., at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting). Justice Holmes stated that punishment
may follow from the expression of opinions where the opinions threaten to interfere
with lawful and immediate purposes. Thus, an immediate check is required to "save
the country." Id
160. Id. (quoted in Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2705).
1991]
25
Montpetit: Constitutional Law—Changes in Defamation Law for the Eighth Circu
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1991
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
tion. 16  "Opinion" and "idea" are separate concepts, deserv-
ing different first amendment protection. 62 Reading Gertz in
light of the "marketplace of ideas" concept, the Court pointed
out a "mistaken reliance" on the Gertz dicta, and refused to
recognize an additional constitutional safeguard for statements
classified as "opinion" as opposed to "fact.'
163
The Court in Milkovich noted the dangers involved in creat-
ing a hard and fast rule for classifying fact and opinion and in
creating a constitutional exception for statements that fall into
the opinion category.164 When a statement is labeled "opin-
ion," the label does not negate the possibility that the utter-
ance implies an assertion of objective fact.' 65 The judicial
system would undermine the foundation and purpose of the
law of defamation if an individual could escape liability simply
by burying false statements of fact in language that connotes
the individual's opinion. 6 6 The stated and complete facts
upon which an opinion is based may be incorrect, incomplete
or erroneous, running a high risk of conveying or implying
false defamatory information. 67 Although "pure" opinions
are still protected, false assertions of fact, whether expressly
stated or implied, have no place under the umbrella of first
amendment protection.
The Milkovich Court, noting that the fact-opinion distinction
is irrelevant and unnecessary, viewed the dispositive question
in light of a "reasonable factfinder" standard.' 68 Could a "rea-
sonable factfinder" have concluded that the nine statements in
Diadiun's column, including "Maple beat the law with the 'big
lie,' "169 imply an assertion of objective fact, that Milkovich
perjured himself at the judicial proceeding?
70
First, the Court viewed the alleged defamatory statements in
161. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2705.
162. Id.
163. Id. ("Thus, we do not think [the dicta] from Gertz was intended to create a
wholesale defamation exemption for anything that might be labeled 'opinion.' ").
164. Id.
165. Id. at 2705-06.
166. Id. at 2706. Under the common law doctrine of fair comment, expressions of
opinion did not extend to false statements of fact. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 566 comment a (1977)).
167. Id.
168. Id. at 2707.
169. Id. at 2698.
170. Id. at 2707.
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light of existing constitutional doctrines. The Court stated
that the doctrines enumerated in New York Times through Bose
Corp. adequately "ensure the freedom of expression guaran-
teed by the First Amendment."'' Second, the Court held that
the language used in the article was not the sort of "loose, fig-
urative or hyperbolic language" that would negate the implica-
tion that actual facts about Milkovich were being stated.
7 2
Third, the inference of perjury was based on an objectively
verifiable event. Finally, the statement was capable of being
proven true or false.' 73 Taking all the factors into considera-
tion, a reasonable factfinder could conclude that Diadiun's col-
umn implied a factual assertion that Milkovich committed
perjury.
174
3. Justice Brennan's Dissent
In the 7-2 decision, Justice Brennan, with whom Justice Mar-
shall concurred, offered a slightly different view of the major-
ity's discussion regarding the scope of first amendment
protection for opinions. 7 5 Justice Brennan agreed with the
rules set forth by the majority, but disagreed in their applica-
tion to the alleged defamatory statements.' 76 He argued that
the majority only provided general guidance for deciding when
statements of opinion imply a false and defamatory fact. He
suggested that the defamatory statements at issue deserved
further inquiry, broader evaluation, and must be read in the
context of the whole column.' 77 Justice Brennan concluded
171. Id
172. Id. Nor does the "general tenor" of the article negate the impression that
Milkovich committed perjury. Id For a discussion of the "loose, figurative or hyper-
bolic language" that receives first amendment protection, see supra notes 126-40.
173. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2707. The Court held that whether Milkovich lied at
the judicial proceedings can be determined from objective evidence. Milkovich's tes-
timony before the Athletic Association can be compared with his subsequent testi-
mony before the trial court. Id
174. Id. The majority did not rest its decision on any finding that the defendant's
column expressly stated a false and defamatory fact. Id.
175. See id at 2708-15 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
176. Id. at 2709.
With all of the above, I am essentially in agreement. I part company
with the Court at the point where it applies these general rules to the state-
ments at issue in this case because I find that the challenged statements can-
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that the statements at issue could not be interpreted to mean
that Milkovich perjured himself.'
7
Justice Brennan looked closely at the language of the article
to support his argument that the statements did not imply a
factual assertion. After Diaduin reported the events leading up
to the judicial proceedings, the article interjected "cautionary
language" to reflect what Diaduin presumed. 79 Diaduin used
language such as "seemed," "probably," and "apparently" to
describe the incident.' 8 0 The use of cautionary language often
signals opinions, putting the reader on notice that what follows
is not to be understood as factual. 8' Affording great weight to
Diadiun's choice of vocabulary, Justice Brennan concluded that
a reasonable reader would not interpret Diadiun's column as
stating defamatory facts. 1
82
Justice Brennan also inquired into the tone and format of
the article, two aspects of Diadiun's column on which the ma-
jority was silent.'8 " He described the tone as "pointed, exag-
gerated and heavily laden with emotional rhetoric and moral
outrage."'8 4 The format of the article, a signed editorial cap-
tioned "TD Says" with a photograph of Diadiun, signaled that
the article was simply "one man's commentary."' 8 5 "Certain
formats-editorials, reviews, political cartoons, letters to the
editor-signal the reader to anticipate a departure from what is
actually known by the author as fact."'8t 6 A reasonable reader
often discredits statements read in these formats and is less
likely to perceive the information as factual.'8 7  Viewed to-
178. Id.
179. Id. at 2712.
180. Id. Justice Brennan noted that Diadiun prefaced his commentary about
Milkovich's "more plausible version of the representation" with the cautionary term
"apparently." Cautionary words such as "apparently" act as a red flag to the reader.
Used in the context of Diadiun's article, Justice Brennan interpreted the word "ap-
parently" as "an unmistakable sign that Diadiun did not know what Milkovich had
actually said in court." Id. Moreover, Justice Brennan felt that "[ult is plain from the
column" that Diadiun attended the meet, not the judicial proceeding. Id. at 2711.
181. Id. at 2712 (citing several cases for the proposition that cautionary language
is less likely to be understood as a statement of fact).
182. Id. at 2709. Justice Brennan noted that "[r]eaders could see that Diadiun was
focused on the court's reversal of the [Athletic Association's] decision and was an-
grily supposing what must have led to it." Id. at 2712.
183. Id. at 2712-13.
184. Id. at 2712.
185. Id. at 2713.
186. Id. (citing Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 986 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
187. Id. at 2712-13.
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gether, the tone and format may "notify readers to expect
speculation and personal judgment."
8 8
Justice Brennan suggested that the majority's lack of solici-
tous evaluation of recognizable conjecture resulted in an inad-
equate balance between reputation and free speech.' 89 He
argued that free speech was compromised if the speaker is re-
quired to expose all the facts since "often only some of the
facts are known."' 90 Many reporters and public commentators
do not have access to all the facts, and mandatory exposure
runs the risk of chilling free speech. Conjecture coupled with
research are often necessary to prompt the " 'uninhibited, ro-
bust, and wide-open' debate to which this country is pro-
foundly committed."'' Justice Brennan placed conjecture in
the same category as "imaginative expression" and "rhetorical
hyperbole," deserving of protection to foster the goals of the
first amendment and preserve the free interchange of informa-
tion on matters of public importance. 92 For example, the
question "Did NASA officials ignore sound warnings that the
Challenger Space Shuttle would explode?" raises important is-
sues of public concern and was asked prior to the accumulation
188. Id. at 2712.
189. Id. at 2713-14. A court's inquiry must apply to the proper statement. The
majority compared two similar statements and concluded that "[s]imply couching
such statements in terms of opinion" does not dispel the implication that the speaker
implies a knowledge of facts. Id. at 2706. "'In my opinion Jones is a liar,' can cause
as much damage to reputation as the statement, 'Jones is a liar.' " Id. Although Jus-
tice Brennan agreed with the majority on this point, he took the analysis even further:
[A] different result must obtain if the speaker's comments had instead been
as follows: "Jones' brother once lied to me; Jones just told me he was 25;
I've never met Jones before and I don't actually know how old he is or any-
thing else about him, but he looks 16; I think Jones lied about his age just
now.
Id. at 2710. According to Justice Brennan, the first statement "is factual and defama-
tory and may support a defamation action by Jones' brother." Id. The second state-
ment, on the other hand, can only be interpreted that the speaker infers that Jones
told a particular lie. According to Justice Brennan, "[i]f the inference is sincere or
nondefamatory, the speaker [cannot] be held liable for defamation." Id. "The oper-
ative question remains whether reasonable readers would have actually interpreted
the statement as implying defamatory facts." Id. at 2710 n.3 (citing Zimmerman,
Curbing the High Price of Loose Talk, 18 U.C.D.L. REV. 359 (1985)); Note, The Fact-
Opinion Dilemma in First Amendment Defamation Law, 13 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 545
(1987); Comment, Statements of Fact, Statements of Opinion, and the First Amendment, 74
CALIF. L. REV. 1001 (1986).
190. Id. at 2714.
191. Id. (quoting New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
192. Id. (citing Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988)).
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of all the facts.19 3 The question is simply a way of soliciting
additional facts from those who know more. 194 Justice Bren-
nan believed that punishing Diadiun's conjecture infringed
on the latitude necessary for adequate first amendment
protection. ' 95
III. A NEW ANALYSIS ON OPINIONS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
The Supreme Court's decision in Milkovich changed the law
of defamation, particularly with respect to the fact-opinion dis-
tinction and with respect to deciding what statements are wor-
thy of first amendment protection and who will make that
determination. This section focuses on the change in tradi-
tional analysis and the effect Milkovich may have in the Eighth
Circuit.
A. Rejecting the "Totality of the Circumstances" Test, as Adopted by
the Eighth Circuit in Janklow v. Newsweek, Inc.
The Court in Milkovich declared that Gertz does not mandate
a fact-opinion distinction because statements labeled "opin-
ion" are not absolutely protected under the first amend-
ment. "9 6 Milkovich thus rendered the Olman four-part "totality
of the circumstances" test obsolete.' 97 The Court's holding di-
rectly conflicts with the Eighth Circuit's historical treatment of
alleged defamatory statements."" The "artificial dichotomy"
between fact and opinion is no longer recognized. "' Thus,
the Eighth Circuit's test, as formulated inJanklow and used to
label a statement "fact" or "opinion," has now been replaced.
193. Id. Justice Brennan used two other questions to illustrate this point: "Did
Cuban-American leaders arrange for John Fitzgerald Kennedy's assassination? Was
Kurt Waldheim a Nazi officer?" These questions "are matters of public concern long
before all the facts are unearthed, if they ever are." Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. Justice Brennan concluded, "Diadiun, therefore, is guilty. He is guilty of
jumping to conclusions, of benightedly assuming that court decisions are always
based on the merits, and of looking foolish to lawyers. He is not, however, liable for
defamation. Ignorance, without more, has never served to defeat freedom of
speech." Id. (emphasis in original).
196. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2705.
197. Id. at 2706.
198. See, e.g., Deupree v. Iliff, 860 F.2d 300, 303 (8th Cir. 1988) ("In the context
of the first amendment, whether a statement is one of fact or opinion is a question of
law to be decided by the court.") (citingJanklow v. Newsweek, Inc., 788 F.2d 1300,
1305 n.7 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 883 (1986)).
199. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2706.
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The Milkovich Court rejected the cumulative, per se applica-
tion of the four-part test in determining constitutional protec-
tion for alleged defamatory statements. Although the Court
relied on existing constitutional law to determine liability, cer-
tain aspects of the four-part test, such as verifiability, are still
helpful in the analysis. A statement must be sufficiently factual
to be capable of being proven true or false before protection
will be afforded. 0° Statements are also protected if they can-
not be interpreted as stating or implying actual facts.2 0 ' In de-
termining the extent of liability, the Milkovich Court did not
consider the social and literary context in which the statement
appeared. Moreover, the Court's holding rests on defamation
by implication. For the Eighth Circuit, Milkovich will narrow
the scope of the opinion privilege and broaden the scope of
actionable fact.
1. Narrowing the Opinion Privilege
Prior to Milkovich, the Eighth Circuit extended broad protec-
tion to defamation defendants under the opinion privilege. 0 2
A defendant merely had to show that the statement was an
opinion and the court granted absolute first amendment pro-
tection, usually through a pre-trial dispositive motion. How-
ever, the Milkovich Court did not interpret the opinion
privilege so broadly. The Court preserved the "verifiability"
part of the four-part test. Thus, the inquiry must focus on
whether the statement is capable of being proven true or
false. 0 3 But even with a per se opinion, a court must question
whether the statement can reasonably be understood as either
implying or stating actual facts. Application of the Supreme
Court's analysis to existing Eighth Circuit law illustrates how
Milkovich narrows the scope of the opinion privilege.
a. Preserving Verifiability
Milkovich requires a statement to be objectively verifiable
200. Id. at 2707 (finding the defendant's statements to be "sufficiently factual to
be susceptible of being proved true or false").
201. Id ("This is not the sort of loose, figurative or hyperbolic language which
would negate the impression that the writer was seriously maintaining [Milkovich]
committed the crime of perjury.").
202. See supra notes 33-67 and accompanying text.
203. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2707.
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before that statement can be actionable.2 0°  The Eighth Circuit
declares a statement verifiable if the statement is subject to any
sort of quantification, or if the statement alleges a specific ac-
cusation of wrongdoing.20 5 However, rejecting the cumulative
application of the four-part test makes it more difficult to over-
come verifiability with other considerations, such as context.
Under the Janklow test, the Eighth Circuit balanced ver-
ifiability against the other three factors since "no solitary crite-
rion [could] be dispositive. ' 20 6 Even when the statement was
verifiable, the "totality of the circumstances" test allowed the
Eighth Circuit to protect the statement if the court found the
language and context represented the personal view or opin-
ion of the speaker. 2 7 In Price v. Viking Penguin, Inc.20 the
Eighth Circuit cited Scott v. News-Herald for the proposition
that, in context, a verifiable statement may still be opinion.20 9
In Scott, the Ohio Supreme Court conceded that the plain im-
port of the challenged statements, the commission of perjury,
was verifiable. 2 10  However, the context in which the state-
ments appeared, along with their broader setting, moved the
Ohio court to dismiss the complaint and find the statements
protected opinion.2 ''
On its face, the "totality of the circumstances" test pur-
ported to distinguish actionable fact from protected opinion in
an impartial, unbiased and evenhanded manner. In reality, the
204. Id.
205. See Price v. Viking Penguin, Inc., 881 F.2d 1426, 1432 (8th Cir. 1989) (hold-
ing that a statement cannot be verified "[w]here quantification for a general assertion
is impossible"), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 757 (1990); Janklow v. Newsweek, Inc., 788 F.
2d 1300, 1302 (8th Cir.) (en banc) ("A statement regarding a potentially provable
proposition can be phrased so that it is hard to establish, or it may intrinsically be
unsuited to any sort of quantification."), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 883 (1986); Stock v.
Heiner, 696 F. Supp. 1253, 1260 (D. Minn. 1988) (holding that a specific accusation
of wrongdoing could be verified).
206. Janklow, 788 F.2d at 1302.
207. See Price, 881 F.2d at 1438 (A statement which "would ordinarily be consid-
ered factual" was protected since it was a "qualitative judgment."), cert. denied, 110 S.
Ct. 757 (1990); Brelsford & Myers, supra note 154, at 28 (The "totality of the circum-
stances" test allowed courts to find that a statement was "opinion," even if it could
be interpreted as stating or implying fact, so long as other factors weighed against
this conclusion.).
208. 881 F.2d 1426 (8th Cir. 1989).
209. Id. at 1438 n.9 (citing Scott v. News-Herald, 25 Ohio St. 3d 243, 252-55, 496
N.E.2d 699, 707-08 (1986)).
210. Scott, 25 Ohio St. 3d at 251-53, 496 N.E.2d at 707.
211. Id. at 252-54, 496 N.E.2d at 707-09.
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four-part test gave courts great latitude to label a statement
"opinion." Judge Bowman, dissenting in Janklow, expressed
the same concern, stating that "[b]eauty is in the eye of the
beholder, and it would appear that the result to be obtained
through application of the [four] factors is in the eye of the
judge.
2 12
While Millovich will narrow the Eighth Circuit's interpreta-
tion of the opinion privilege, Milkovich did not expressly bal-
ance verifiability against the broad backdrop of the factors
enunciated in Janklow. The Court in Milkovich placed greater
emphasis on the single issue of verifiability, holding that the
statement must be "sufficiently factual to be susceptible of be-
ing proved true or false."'213 Other jurisdictions have also in-
terpreted Milkovich as affording greater emphasis to whether
the statement is sufficiently factual to be capable of being
proven true or false.21 4 For example, the Florida Supreme
Court synthesized the Milkovich holding into one test:
"[A]ssuming [the statements] are a subject of public concern,
... if the statements are capable of being proved false, they are
not protected. 2 1 5 Moreover, even if the statements are "in-
212. Janklow v. Newsweek, Inc., 788 F.2d 1300, 1307 (8th Cir. 1986) (Bowman, J.,
dissenting). Other courts and commentators have also criticized the "totality of the
circumstances" test for its overinclusiveness and lack of guidance. See Note, supra
note 55, at 619 (finding that the "totality of the circumstances" test does not provide
concrete guidance); Comment, Structuring Defamation Law to Eliminate the Fact-Opinion
Determination: A Critique of Ollman v. Evans, 71 IowA L. REV. 913, 920 (arguing that
the functional approach to the fact-opinion distinction is irrelevant since the current
legal framework is fully capable of resolving defamation disputes).
Three of the Ohio justices in Scott also dissented with respect to the application
of the four-part test. Chief Justice Celebrezze stated that the test is "used to com-
plete the Jekyll and Hyde transformation of this newspaper article from fact to opin-
ion. This test is not only unworkable, it is applied by the majority in self-
contradictory fashion to reach an untenable result." Scott, 25 Ohio St. 3d at 263, 496
N.E.2d at 716 (footnote omitted). Justice Sweeney criticized "the majority's new
,test' [as] in reality no test at all, because its components can be juxtaposed to forge
any interpretation that the user of the 'test' desires." Id. at 267, 496 N.E.2d at 719.
Justice Brown found the test to be "so malleable and spongy as to permit any inter-
pretation anyone wishes" and "makes every statement of fact a statement of opin-
ion." Id. at 273, 276, 496 N.E.2d at 723, 725.
213. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2707.
214. See, e.g., Florida Medical Center, Inc. v. New York Post Co., 568 So. 2d 454,
458 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990). But see Moyer v. Amador Valley Joint Union School
Dist., 225 Cal. App. 3d 720, 275 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1990) (finding that "Milkovich did
not substantially change the[] principles" developed under Gertz; the issue of whether
a reasonable factfinder would conclude that statements imply provably false factual
assertion "is determined by applying the 'totality of circumstances' test").
215. Florida Medical Center, 568 So. 2d at 458.
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herently unverifiable,12 1 6 the next level of inquiry under
Milkovich is whether the statement can reasonably be inter-
preted as stating provable facts about an individual, not
whether other mitigating factors such as context override ver-
ifiability. The second level of inquiry under Milkovich is a sig-
nificant change in the analysis of defamation cases alleging
opinion as a defense.
b. "Opinion" as a Matter of Law
Milkovich further narrows the scope of protected opinion as a
matter of law with regard to "rhetorical hyperbole" and "imag-
inative expression. "217 Governed by the Bresler, Letter Carriers,
Falwell21 8 line of cases, a statement is protected as a matter of
law if it conveys a message so figurative and pejorative no rea-
sonable person would interpret the message as stating or im-
plying actual facts about the individual.21 9
Historically, the Eighth Circuit turned to Gertz and stated
that because opinions cannot be false, they are absolutely pro-
tected under the first amendment. 22' However, Milkovich re-
jected this historical proposition, and made it clear that
protected speech, as a matter of law, refers to rhetorical hyper-
bole, vigorous epithets, and lusty and imaginative expres-
sion.2 2' In light of prior Eighth Circuit decisions, the
parameters set forth in Milkovich restrict the category of pro-
tected opinion as a matter of law.
222
Milkovich creates a balance between an objective standard of
verifiability and a subjective threshold for opinions protected
as a matter of law. Arguably, the analysis in Milkovich will tem-
per the "malleable and spongy" four-part test, criticized for
permitting "any interpretation anyone wishes. 2  Unques-
tionably, Milkovich narrows the scope of protected opinion in
the Eighth Circuit.
216. Deupree v. Iliff, 860 F.2d 300, 303 (8th Cir. 1988).
217. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2706.
218. See supra notes 125-48 and accompanying text.
219. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2706.
220. See, e.g., Deupree, 860 F.2d at 304.
221. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2706-07; see also Immuno AG. v. Moor-Jankowski, No.
264, slip op. at 9 (N.Y. Ct. App. Jan. 15, 1991).
222. By recognizing that the burden of proving falsity is on the plaintiff, Milkovich
does attempt to mitigate against the narrow confines of protected opinion as a matter
of law. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2704.
223. Scott v. News-Herald, 25 Ohio St. 3d 243, 273, 496 N.E.2d 699, 723 (1986).
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2. Broadening Actionable Fact
While narrowing the scope of protected opinion, Milkovich
broadly construes actionable fact in two ways. First, the Court
did not consider the literary and social context of the article.
Context often played a pervasive and compelling role in the
Eighth Circuit fact-opinion analysis. Second, the Court stated
that the utterance need only imply an assertion of objective fact,
encompassing defamation by implication which has not yet
been recognized in the Eighth Circuit.
a. Rejecting the Context Analysis
A critical difference between prior Eighth Circuit fact-opin-
ion analysis and Milkovich is that the Supreme Court did not
consider the literary and broad context of the statement." 4
Although the Court acknowledged that the "general tenor" of
the article did not negate a defamatory implication, the major-
ity did not discuss the "conjectural language of the disputed
article, or the format of the piece-a signed editorial column
appearing on the sports page. 212 5 The majority's failure to
mention either point is particularly compelling in light of the
importance the Ohio Supreme Court placed on both conjec-
tural language and format.226 Moreover, the impact of the ma-
jority's silence is further elevated when compared to Justice
Brennan's dissent. 
2 27
Historically, the Eighth Circuit gave great weight to the for-
mat of the piece in which the challenged statements appeared.
The Eighth Circuit stated that " 'the distinction between fact
and opinion can... be made only in context' ",228 to determine
if the language and setting "would signal the reader to expect
224. The author's subsequent use of "context" includes "literary context" as well
as "broad context," the third and fourth parts of the four-part test. The Eighth Cir-
cuit considered the "literary context" of the publication to include language, style,
and intended audience. Price v. Viking Penguin, Inc., 881 F.2d 1426, 1432 (8th Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 757 (1990).
225. Immuno AG. v. Moor-Jankowski, 77 N.Y.2d 235, 244, 567 N.E.2d 1270,
1275, 566 N.Y.S.2d 906, 911 (1991).
226. See Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2707 (noting that "the general tenor of the article"
does not negate the impression that "the writer was seriously maintaining
[Milkovich] committed the crime of perjury").
227. Id. at 2709 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also supra notes 176-96 and accompa-
nying text.
228. Deupree v. Iliff, 860. F.2d 300, 303 (8th Cir. 1988) (quoting Ollman v. Evans,
750 F.2d 970, 982 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
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a fair amount of opinion. '2 29 Sports pages were traditionally
viewed as "a traditional haven for cajoling, invective, and hy-
perbole. '12 3 0 The same reasoning applied to "Op-Ed" (opin-
ion-editorial page) articles 23 and letters to the editor.23 2 For
example, in Olman, the court determined that a reasonable
reader is fully aware that statements printed in an editorial or
Op-Ed page are not "hard" news.233 Following the same rea-
soning in Olman, the Eighth Circuit in Secrist v. Harkin 234 ex-
tended the protective reach of the "literary context" to a press
release. 23 5 The Secrist court held that a press release signaled
the same political opinion as would a newspaper or political
cartoon.23 6 InJanklow, the court stated that magazines "have a
tradition of more colorful, even feisty language, than do dai-
lies."12 3 7 Arguably, most readers do understand that "editorial
writers and commentators frequently 'resort to the type of
caustic bombast traditionally used in editorial writing to stimu-
late public reach.' ",238 Assuming such a belief about the aver-
age reader to be true, the format of the piece often swayed
courts to construe statements as protected opinion when they
might otherwise have been actionable fact.23 9
The Eighth Circuit also considered the use of "cautionary
language" in the fact-opinion analysis.240 Similar to the rea-
229. Janklow v. Newsweek, Inc., 788 F. 2d 1300, 1304 (8th Cir. 1986).
230. Scott v. News-Herald, 25 Ohio St. 3d 243, 253, 496 N.E.2d 699, 708 (1986).
231. See, e.g., Oilman, 750 F.2d at 1036; Loeb v. Globe Newspaper Co., 489 F. Supp
481 (D. Mass 1980); Caron v. Bangor Publishing Co., 470 A.2d 782 (Me.), cert. denied,
467 U.S. 1241 (1984); Dupler v. Mansfield Journal Co., 64 Ohio St. 2d 116, 413
N.E.2d 1187 (1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 962 (1981). But see Costello v. Capital Cities
Media, Inc., 111 Ill. App. 3d 1009, 445 N.E.2d 13 (1982) (Editorial stating that
county board chairman deliberately lied was fact and not opinion.). For an extensive
list of cases decided under the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS as "pure" opinion,
see B. SANFORD, LIBEL AND PRIVACY, § 5.4.2.1 n.34 (1987).
232. See, e.g., Shriver v. Apalachee Publishing Co., 425 So. 2d 1173 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1983). Similar "opinions" have been found in political campaigns, political
cartoons, literary criticism, restaurant and food critiques. R. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFA-
MATION § 6.12[1]-[10] (1986).
233. Oilman, 750 F.2d at 986.
234. 874 F.2d 1244 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 324 (1989).
235. Id. at 1251.
236. Id. at 1249-50.
237. Janklow v. Newsweek, Inc., 788 F.2d 1300, 1304 (8th Cir. 1986).
238. Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 984 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (citations omitted).
239. See, e.g., McHale v. Lake Charles American Press, 390 So. 2d 556 (La. Ct.
App. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 941 (1981); Silsdorf v. Levine, 59 N.Y.2d 8, 449
N.E.2d 716, 462 N.Y.S.2d 822, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 831 (1983).
240. See, e.g., Price v. Viking Penguin, Inc., 881 F.2d 1426, 1436-37 (8th Cir. 1989)
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soning underlying the format analysis, the Eighth Circuit
stated that the use of cautionary language was a red flag indi-
cating "opinions."12 '' However, the Milkovich opinion noted
that the use of cautionary language, or "couching such state-
ments in terms of opinion does not dispel [defamatory] impli-
cations. 2 42 The Court illustrated this proposition with the
words "I think" and "In my opinion. 243 According to the
Eighth Circuit, prefacing a statement with these phrases is
analogous to prefacing a statement with "basically," "proba-
bly," or a disclaimer such as "not necessarily. ' 244 Prior to
Milkovich, the Eighth Circuit interpreted cautionary language
and disclaimers as indicating expressions of opinion. 4 5 Fol-
lowing Milkovich, the use of cautionary language is irrelevant
and cannot be used to protect provably false facts disguised as
246opinion.
The literary and social context, highly relevant to the Eighth
Circuit, are now irrelevant under Milkovich.247 The Eighth Cir-
cuit often found the language and format so indicative of
"opinion," both factors outweighed verifiability and the state-
ment was categorically protected. However, the language and
format no longer carry enough weight to override a provably
false factual connotation. Practically speaking, the Milkovich
holding imposes a greater risk of libel on all editorials, com-
mentaries, and reviews, the "well recognized home[s] of opin-
ion and comment. ' 248  The Milkovich Court's failure to
consider various contextual factors deviates substantially from
traditional analysis and broadens the scope of actionable fact.
(analyzing the disputed statement in light of cautionary language); Deupree v. Iliff,
860 F.2d 300, 303-04 (8th Cir. 1988) (noting the use of cautionary language and the
fact that the statements were aired on a radio talk show);Janklow, 788 F.2d at 1302,
1304 (considering the cautionary language and the fact that the challenged state-
ments appeared in Newsweek magazine).
241. See Price, 881 F. 2d at 1436.
242. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695, 2705-06 (1990).
243. Id.
244. Deupree, 860 F.2d at 303.
245. Id. at 303-04 (citing Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 982-83 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
246. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2707.
247. Compare id. (not considering the fact that the statements appeared in a sports
editorial) with id. at 2712-13 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (including the tone and format
of the article in his analysis).
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b. Recognition of Defamation by Implication
The Court's rejection of the cumulative application of the
four-part test in Milkovich conflicts with the practical applica-
tion of "specificity" in the Eighth Circuit. Precision and speci-
ficity are required to determine if a challenged statement
"actually recite[d] specific factual events. "249 Price expressly
stated that the Eighth Circuit does not recognize defamation
by implication.2 5 ° Contrary to the current state of the law in
the Eighth Circuit, Milkovich opens the door to defamation by
implication.
The Milkovich Court acknowledged that defamatory implica-
tions are not worthy of first amendment protection, allowing
for broader construction of actionable fact. The Court stated
that a successful defamation action merely requires a reason-
able factfinder to understand that the utterance implied an as-
sertion of objective fact.25' The plain import of the holding is
bolstered in light of the Court's dicta, stating that "[e]ven if the
speaker states the facts upon which he bases his opinion, if
those facts are either incorrect or incomplete, or if his assess-
ment of them is erroneous, the statement may still imply a false
249. Price v. Viking Penguin, Inc., 881 F.2d 1426, 1432 (8th Cir. 1989).
250. Where a statement or phrase is susceptible of more than one meaning,
we will not presume either that the phrase means what the plaintiff asserts it
does or that it is factual where it can be understood as an opinion. We do
not recognize defamation by implication.
Id. (citations omitted).
Prior to Price, the Eighth Circuit set forth powerful limitations with respect to
defamation by implication surrounding materially true reports. InJanklow, the plain-
tiff claimed that a story in Newsweek implied that he was guilty of raping a 14-year-
old. The rape allegation itself was a materially true fact. The court refused to recog-
nize defamation by implication even though the article omitted the facts that (1) Jan-
klow passed a polygraph exam while the alleged victim was "untestable" for a
polygraph exam because of her emotional state; (2) a medical examination failed to
show signs of rape; and (3) "a number of federal authorities ... called the rape
charges 'unfounded.' " Janklow, 759 F.2d at 648. The court's holding is particularly
compelling in light of the serious accusation.
251. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2705. In Milkovich, the Court found that nine
sentences, coupled with a caption, implied a defamatory allegation. Moreover, the
implication was sufficiently capable of being proven true or false. The holding, in
part, is similar to the "mixed opinion" analysis set forth in the RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS. The RESTATEMENT takes the position that if the speaker implies the
existence of undisclosed defamatory facts as the basis for the opinion, the statement
is subject to a libel action. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 comment a; see
also White v. Fraternal Order of Police, 909 F.2d 512, 523 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (citing
Milkovich as support for defamation by implication); Trager & Chamberlin, The Dan-
gerous Exception to Protection for Opinion, 11 COMM. & L., 51 (1989).
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assertion of fact." '52 The Milkovich dicta suggests that the
omission of facts is likely to support a claim of defamation by
implication.
However, the Milkovich opinion does not give free reign to a
trier of fact to find a statement defamatory based solely on im-
plication. The implication itself must still be sufficiently sus-
ceptible of being proved true or false.253 If the implication
itself is verifiable and defamatory, the statement will be denied
constitutional protection. The analysis correctly focuses on
the defamatory implication, rather than the underlying asser-
tions giving rise to the implication.254 Moreover, defamation
by implication is not treated any differently than a traditional
defamation action.255 In application, however, Milkovich will
also support a libelous implication in the absence of any ex-
pressed opinion on behalf of the speaker.256 The Court un-
questionably extended the substantive reach of defamation
claims, arguably at the expense of the first amendment.
3. A Retrospective View of Janklow
A review of Janklow illustrates how drastically the Supreme
Court's decision in Milkovich altered the law of defamation
within the Eighth Circuit. Foremost, the Court stated that
"Gertz was [not] intended to create a wholesale defamation ex-
emption for anything that might be labeled 'opinion.' "257
This statement undermines the Eighth Circuit's premise inJan-
kow that "[o]pinion is absolutely protected under the First
Amendment. '258 TheJanklow court also noted that "[t]he im-
putation of improper motive must be drawn from this sentence
in the article by implication. 21 5 9 Thus, the Eighth Circuit con-
ceded that a reasonable reader can draw the implication of a
252. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2706.
253. Id. at 2707. Other courts have gone so far as to say that even if all the facts
are accurately reported, the statement may still amount to actionable libel. See, e.g.,
Forsher v. Bugliosi, 26 Cal. 3d 792, 803, 608 P.2d 716, 721, 163 Cal. Rptr. 628, 634
(1980); Synanon Found., Inc. v. Time, Inc., 5 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1924, 1928 (Cal.
Super. 1979) (holding that "[t]he individual sentences or phrases of a publication
taken separately may not reveal any defamatory thrust but, like the pieces of a jigsaw
puzzle, taken together a picture of libel may yet be revealed").
254. White, 909 F.2d at 523.
255. Id. at 522-23.
256. Brelsford & Myers, supra note 154, at 31.
257. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2705.
258. Janklow v. Newsweek, Inc., 788 F.2d 1300, 1302 (8th Cir. 1986).
259. Id. at 1304.
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defamatory utterance, the underlying premise of the Court's
holding in Milkovich. The Eighth Circuit further conceded that
"th[e] story would have been fairer to Janklow and more in-
formative to the reader if the chronology of [events] had been
more fully explained. ' 260  One can reasonably infer from
Milkovich that the individually true but collectively incomplete
statements inJanklow may still imply a false assertion of fact.
26'
The fact that the statements at issue in Janklow appeared in
Newsweek, an important factor in the Eighth Circuit's holding,
would be meritless after Milkovich. Although the Eighth Cir-
cuit found the statement in Janklow protected as a matter of
law, the implicating statement, "[e]ight months laterJanklow-
who had won his election despite the messy publicity-was
prosecuting Banks,"' 262 is far from "the sort of loose, figurative
or hyperbolic language" that would negate a defamatory impli-
cation.2 63 The protected opinion inJanklow takes on the char-
acteristics of actionable facts under Milkovich, a determination
that may now be for the jury.
B. Procedural Changes
Not only does Milkovich mandate substantive changes, the
Court's decision will also alter the litigation process for defa-
mation cases. First, pretrial dispositive motions are less likely
to prevail because of the narrowed privilege for opinions as a
matter of law. Second, the jury now plays a more significant
role in determining actionable fact from immune opinion. 6
The practical effect of this change will be more libel cases be-
ing litigated and more decisions being placed in the hands of
the jury.
The media has lost an invaluable mechanism for disposing
260. Id. at 1306.
261. See, e.g., Newton v. National Broadcasting Co., 13 Media L. Rep (BNA) 1224,
1229 (D. Nev. 1986) (holding that individually true statements about Wayne
Newton's ties to organized crime conveyed a false implication).
262. Janklow, 788 F.2d at 1303.
263. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695, 2707 (1990).
264. Traditionally, the fact-opinion determination was a question of law. RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 comment c (1977) ("It is the function of the
court to determine whether an expression of opinion is capable of bearing a defama-
tory meaning .... "); see also Cianci v. New York Times Publishing Co., 639 F.2d 54
(2d Cir. 1980) (accusations of crime not protected opinion as a matter of law); Orr v.
Argus-Press Co., 586 F.2d 1108, 1114 (6th Cir. 1978) (quoting the RESTATEMENT),
cert. denied, 440 U.S. 960 (1979).
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of libel claims in an efficient and economical manner and for
preventing the threat of self-censorship.265 Because Milkovich
rejected the "distinction between opinion and fact . . .[as] a
matter of law," a motion for summary judgment will only pre-
vail if the court finds that "no reasonable juror could find the
challenged language to be a statement of fact. ' '2 66 The impli-
cations run afoul of the judicial policy of the Eighth Circuit,
which has traditionally noted the importance of summary judg-
ment procedures applied to first amendment issues inherent in
defamation actions. 67 The protection afforded the first
amendment traditionally resulted in the disposition of libel ac-
tions at an early stage of the litigation, shielding the funda-
mental goals of the first amendment prior to costly
litigation. 268 However, as a result of Milkovich, the chances of a
media defendant prevailing in a dispositive motion are slim be-
cause defendants can no longer rely on a broad-based privilege
for opinions. The outcome of first amendment cases will now
be determined by a jury.
Contrary to judicial precedent, Milkovich characterized the
dispositive inquiry as a question of fact for the jury.2 6 9 If an
utterance could reasonably be understood as either implying
or stating a defamatory fact, the question will fall to the jury
under a reasonable factfinder standard.270 The Eighth Circuit,
on the other hand, has consistently declared the fact-opinion
265. See White v. Fraternal Order of Police, 909 F.2d 512, 522-23 (D.C. Cir. 1990)
(reversing an award of summary judgment in light of Milkovich); Comment, supra note
21, at 1028 (noting that litigation for defamation actions cost approximately four
times as much as those disposed of by summary judgment; summary judgment also
avoids the possibility of a prejudiced jury and reduces unfavorable verdicts).
266. Brelsford & Myers, supra note 154, at 31 (emphasis in original).
267. Treutler v. Meredith Corp., 455 F.2d 255, 257 n.l (8th Cir. 1972).
268. Id.; see also Janklow v. Newsweek, Inc., 788 F.2d 1300, 1307 (8th Cir. 1986)
(Bowman, J., dissenting) (noting that the case was disposed of too quickly, leaving
the fact-opinion issue theoretically unanswered); Lauderback v. American Broadcast-
ing Co., 741 F.2d 193, 198 (8th Cir. 1984) (acknowledging that summary judgment is
an "extraordinary means" of disposing of a lawsuit, but it may be "particularly ap-
propriate" in defamation actions).
269. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695, 2707 (1990) ("The dis-
positive question in the present case then becomes whether or not a reasonable
factfinder could conclude .... "); Brelsford & Myers, supra note 154, at 31.
270. A minority of courts have already employed the jury in fact-opinion determi-
nations. See, e.g., Good Gov't Group v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. 3d 672, 586 P.2d 572,
150 Cal. Rptr. 258 (1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 961 (1979).
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determination to be for the court.27 t If the court found that, as
a matter of law, the statement was "fact," the issue of whether
or not the statement was defamatory was decided by a jury. 72
Now that Milkovich has significantly decreased the scope of
protected opinions as a matter of law, the jury will be deciding
more libel claims. Historically, the courts escorted the first
amendment through battlefields of litigation and surrounded
free speech with protective judicial principles, particularly with
respect to media defendants. A jury may not guard the sover-
eignty of the first amendment so fiercely. The Court in
Milkovich argued that independent appellate review on the is-
sue of falsity protects free speech and any erroneous jury ver-
dicts. However, "the promise of appellate protection may
prove empty when appellate courts actually face the daunting
task of reversing a jury finding of falsity."-273
CONCLUSION
In New York Times v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court stated:
"Whatever is added to the field of libel is taken from the field
of free debate. ' 274 Although viewed as a warning in New York
Times, Milkovich contributes to the truth of that statement. The
Supreme Court's decision steps away from first amendment
protection, creates a new avenue of potential liability, and will
conceivably "chill" the free flow of ideas. For years, the media
appeared impenetrable. If a case progressed from pre-trial
posture, the first amendment issue was in the hands of the
judge "as a matter of law."
Invariably, distinguishing fact from opinion produced dis-
concerting results. In an attempt to clarify the inherent diffi-
culties surrounding actionable fact and protected opinion,
Milkovich disposed of the constitutionally required distinction
and relied on existing constitutional doctrines. However, the
new standard of liability neither clarifies nor explains the law
of defamation. The standard simply narrows the scope of pro-
tected opinion as a matter of law and broadly construes action-
able fact.
271. See, e.g., Lauderback, 741 F.2d at 196 n.6; Stock v. Heiner, 696 F. Supp. 1253,
1259 (D. Minn. 1988).
272. Stock, 696 F. Supp. at 1260.
273. Brelsford & Myers, supra note 154, at 32.
274. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 272 (1964) (quoting Sweeney v.
Patterson, 128 F.2d 457, 458 (D.C. Cir. 1942)).
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The heightened perception of liability imposes the threat of
media self-censorship, contrary to the ideals of the first amend-
ment. Moreover, the decision may place the ideals of the first
amendment in the hands of a jury. In light of the substantive
and procedural changes, Milkovich will have a substantial im-
pact on defamation actions in the Eighth Circuit.
Lisa M. Montpetit
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